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This  paper  examines  the  extent  to  which  the  equity  premium  puzzle  can  be  resolved  by  taking 
account  of  the  fact  that  stockholders  bear  a  disproportionate  share  of  output  uncertainty.  We  do 
this  in  the  context  of  a  non-Walrasian  RBC  model  where  risk  reallocation  is  justified  by 
borrowing  restrictions.  The  risk  shifting  mechanism  we  propose  has  the  same  effect  as  would 
arise  from  an  increase  in  the  risk  aversion  parameter  of  the  representative  agent  and  thus 
contributes  to  a  rise  in  the  equity  premium.  As  with  more  standard  RBC  models,  it  remains  that 
our  model  is  unable  to  replicate  key  financial  statistics.  In  particular,  the  observation  that  the 
equity  return  is  more  variable  than  national  product  cannot  be  accounted  for  under  standard 
technology  assumptions. 
1.  Introduction 
From  a theoretical  viewpoint,  among  the  most  general  asset  pricing  models 
developed  to  date  are  those  of  Lucas  (1978)  (discrete-time  exchange  model), 
Brock  (1979,  1982) and  Prescott  and  Mehra  (1980)  (discrete-time  production 
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formulations),  and  Breeden  (19791,  Cox,  Ingersoll,  and  Ross  (19854,  and 
Merton  (1973)  (continuous  time).  This  class  of  models  is referred  to  generi- 
cally  as  the  consumption  capital  asset  pricing  model  (CCAPM).  All  are 
essentially  decentralized  versions  of  the  one-good  representative  agent 
stochastic  growth  model. 
Unfortunately,  empirical  tests  of  these  models  have  led  without  exception 
to their  rejection.  Perhaps  the  most  striking  of these  rejections  is contained  in 
the  study  of  Mehra  and  Prescott  (1985).  In  a  representative  agent  setting,  a 
variant  of  Lucas  (19781, they  show  that  for  reasonable  values  of  the  discount 
factor  and  the  coefficient  of relative  risk aversion  the  implied  equity  premium 
is  too  low  when  the  model  is  calibrated  to  reflect  historically  observed 
aggregate  consumption  growth  rates.’  It  is customary  to  refer  to  this  enigma 
as the  equity  premium  ‘puzzle’. 
Parallel  to  these  developments  in financial  theory  and  built  upon  the  same 
theoretical  foundations  (the  one-good  stochastic  growth  model)  is the  stream 
of  macroeconomic  research  known  as  Real  Business  Cycle  (RBC)  Theory. 
While  researchers  have  found  that  this  same  class  of  models  more  easily 
replicates  the  essential  macroeconomic  features  of  the  business  cycle  [see, 
e.g.,  Kydland  and  Prescott  (1982)  and  Hansen  (198511, a number  of  inconsis- 
tencies  have  nevertheless  emerged.  For  example,  it  has  been  a  challenge  to 
explain  the  observed  relative  variability  of employment  and  productivity  -  the 
so-named  ‘employment-variability  paradox’  [Prescott  (198611. 
This  common  theoretical  basis  for  financial  and  macroeconomic  models 
provides  a  rich  source  of  research  opportunities.  On  the  one  hand,  it  opens 
the  way for  the  simultaneous  ‘cross-model  verification’  of  both  financial  and 
macroeconomic  models.  In  particular,  it  imposes  an  additional  discipline  on 
proposed  solutions  to  the  aforementioned  two  puzzles:  a  solution  to  the 
equity  premium  puzzle,  in order  to be  fully  legitimate,  must  not  diminish  the 
ability  of  the  model  to  replicate  the  macroeconomic  stylized  facts  and, 
reciprocally,  improvements  in  business  cycle  modelling  cannot  come  at  the 
expense  of the  model’s  ability  to replicate  financial  regularities.  After  all, it is 
the  actions  of  the  same  agents  that  give  rise  to  these  economic  phenomena. 
In  addition,  the  methodological  convergence  outlined  above  provides  the 
opportunity  for  a more  careful  understanding  of  the  influence  of  the  macro- 
economy  on  the  behavior  of  asset  prices.  Very  much  in  this  spirit,  Mehra 
and  Prescott  (19851, in  their  original  study,  propose  that  the  magnitude  of 
the  equity  premium  may  be  in  part  the  result  of  income  risk  shifting 
from  workers  to  equity  owners  in  the  context  of  labor  contracts.  They 
write  (p.  157):  ‘Labor  contracts  may  incorporate  an  insurance  feature,  as 
labor  claims  on  output  are  in part  fixed,  having  been  negotiated  prior  to  the 
‘In  Lucas’ (1978) model,  consumption  levels  follow  a stationary  process.  Mehra  and  Prescott 
(1985) allow for  growth  and  nonstationary  consumption,  with  the  rate  of growth  of consumption 
following  a stationary  process.  For  a detailed  exposition  see  Mehra  (1988). J.-P.  Danthine  et al., Equity premium  and  income  risk  511 
realization  of  output.  Hence,  a  disproportionate  part  of  the  uncertainty  in 
output  is  probably  born  by  equity  owners.’  It  is  this  hypothesis  which  we 
intend  to  explore  more  thoroughly,  in  the  context  of  a  non-Walrasian  RBC 
model  first  introduced  in  Danthine  and  Donaldson  (1991a,~).~  Essentially, 
the  model  is  one  in  which  the  effects  of  capital  market  imperfections  are 
ameliorated  through  labor  market  contracting  and  a  social  risk-sharing  ar- 
rangement.  These  latter  aspects  together  guarantee  partial  risk shifting  from 
workers  to  stockholders.  Such  a  setting  further  allows  us  to  evaluate  the 
model  in the  light  of recent  work  by Mankiw  and  Zeldes  (1991) who  find  that 
stockholder  consumption  is  both  more  volatile  and  more  highly  correlated 
with  returns  to  stock  ownership  than  is the  consumption  of  nonstockholders 
(workers  in our  model). 
This  effort  is undertaken  in  the  context  of  a  more  general  survey  of  the 
asset  pricing  implications  of  several  RBC  models,  with  emphasis  on  the 
equity  premium  puzzle.  We  start  from  the  neoclassical  growth  model  itself; 
that  is, from  a  decentralized  pure  Walrasian  formulation  where  the  employ- 
ment-productivity  variability  puzzle  is  present  in  striking  relief.  We  next 
compute  the  equity  premium  implied  by  Hansen’s  (1985)  indivisible  labor 
model,  which  elegantly  resolves  the  employment  variability  puzzle.  Main- 
taining  the  same  perspective,  we  conclude  with  an  evaluation  of  the  non- 
Walrasian  model  introduced  above. 
An  outline  of  the’ paper  is as follows:  Section  2 reviews  the  financial  and 
macroeconomic  stylized  facts,  while  section  3  details  the  three  models  of 
concern.  Section  4 provides  a comparative  numerical  analysis  of  the  proper- 
ties  of  these  models  while  providing  insights  into  the  sources  of their  relative 
performance  characteristics.  Section  5 concludes  the  paper. 
2.  The  macroeconomic  and  financial  stylized  facts 
The  statistics  summarized  in table  1 for  the  U.S.  economy  characterizes  the 
minimal  set  of  macroeconomic  regularities  that  theoretical  models  should  be 
able  to  replicate.  Qualitatively,  we  observe  that  investment  is more  variable 
than  output,  while  consumption  is less variable  and  capital  stock  much  less 
so.  The  variation  in  hours  is approximately  the  same  as  that  of  the  output, 
and  substantially  exceeds  the  variation  in  average  productivity.  All  variables 
are  highly  procyclical  except  the  stock  of  capital  whose  contemporaneous 
correlation  with  output  is nearly  zero.  While  these  regularities  are  generally 
*Many  other  attempts  to  resolve  the  equity  premium  ‘puzzle’  have  been  proposed.  Without 
attempting  to  be  exhaustive,  a  partial  listing  of  suggested  resolutions  is  as  follows:  nondiversifi- 
able  risk  [Mankiw  (198611,  small  probability  events  of  ruin  [Reitz  (1988)],  heterogeneous  beliefs 
[Abel  (1990)],  habit  formation  [Constantinides  (1988)],  and  a  time-varying  lower  bound  on 
consumption  [Nason  (1988)].  For  various  reasons,  however,  few  of  these  theories  have  met  with 
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Table  1 
statistics:  U.S. 
Standard  deviation  percent  (al,  deviation  relative  the  standard  of 
output  contemporaneous  correlation  output  cc).” 
(a)  (bl 
output  1.76  1.00 
Consumption  0.73  0.85 
8.60  4.89 
Capital  stock  0.36  0.04 
(employment)  1.66  0.76 
Productivity  1.18  0.67 
aSource:  Hansen  table  1);  results  are  from  quarterly  that  have 
detrended  using  Hodrick  and  (1980) filter. 
2 
Annual  1889-1978.a 
Series 
Standard  deviation 
percentage  terms) 
return  (re)  16.5 
Risk-free  frt,)  0.8 
Equity  premium  -  r,,)  16.7 
aSource:  and  Prescott 
observed  in  other  developed  countries,  there  are  notable  exceptions  [see 
Danthine  and  Donaldson  (1991b)  who  qualify  the  statement  that  table  1 
defines  the  business  cycle  internationally]. 
On  the  financial  side  the  key observations  are  summarized  in table  2. More 
detailed  information,  in  particular  values  of  the  different  statistics  obtained 
for  different  subperiods,  can be found  in Mehra  and  Prescott  (1985). We  note 
principally  that  the  average  equity  premium  in  the  1889-1978  period  has 
been  of  the  order  of  6 percent,  arising  from  an  average  market  return  of  7 
percent  and  an  average  risk-free  rate  somewhat  below  1 percent. 
Two  other  statistics  are  relevant  for  our  future  analysis.  First,  over  the 
period  in question,  the  average  growth  rate  of  consumption  was  1.8 percent, 
with  a standard  deviation  of  3.6 percent.  Second,  Mankiw  and  Zeldes  (1991) 
report  that  the  correlation  between  the  risk  premium  and  the  consumption 
growth  rate  was 0.4 for  the  same  data  set. 
We  now  turn  to  an  overview  of  the  models  in question. 
3.  pricing  in  RBC  models 
In  this  section,  we  briefly  review  the  characteristics  of  three  distinct  RBC 
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form  [first  suggested  by  Lucas  (197811 in  all three.  It  is the  treatment  of  the 
labor  market  that  principally  differentiates  these  models. 
3.1.  The canonical  optimal  growth  model 
The  foundation  for  all  dynamic  equilibrium  macroeconomic  models  is the 
neoclassical  optimal  growth  paradigm,  augmented  to allow for  a labor-leisure 
choice.  As demonstrated  in Prescott  and  Mehra  (1980),  the  optimal  dynamic 
path  of  macro  aggregates  (consumption,  investment,  etc.)  in  this  model 
corresponds  to  the  growth  path  of  a  decentralized  Walrasian  economy  in 
recursive  competitive  equilibrium.  It  is fully  described  as the  solution  to  the 
following  central  planning  problem: 
subject  to 
k f+l  =  Cl-  a)k,  + i,, 
l,+n,=  1, 
k,  > 0  given. 
In  the  above  model,  c,  i,  k,  1,  and  IZ denote,  respectively,  per  capita 
consumption,  investment,  capital  stock,  leisure,  and  labor  services  (hours) 
provided  in  period  t;  f<  1 is  the  period  production  technology  which  is 
subject  to  a  stochastic  disturbance  z,  u(  ) the  period  utility  function,  E  the 
expectations  operator,  p  the  subjective  discount  factor,  and  S  the  period 
depreciation  rate.  The  stochastic  disturbance  is assumed  to  follow  a Markov 
process  with  transition  function  Q(z,  dz’). 
The  analysis  of  this  problem  is well  known.  Under  quite  general  regularity 
conditions,  the  necessary  first-order  conditions  for  problem  (1)  are  given  by 
n:  u,(c,l  -n)fz(k,n)z=u,(c,l  -n),  (2) 
i:  u,(c,l  -n)  =p/ui(c’,l  -n’) 
x [fl(k’,n’)z’+  (1 -s)]Q(z,dz’),  (3) 
where  c =f(k,  n)z  -i  and  the  subscript  i =  1,2  denotes  the  first  partial 514  J.-P.  Danthine  et  al.,  Equity  premium  and  income  risk 
derivative  with  respect  to  the  ith  argument.  A primed  variable  denotes  next 
period’s  value  of that  variable.  Eqs.  (2) and  (3) have  as their  (unique)  solution 
a  pair  of  stationary  policy  functions,  i(k,  z)  n(k,  z),  which 
(4) 
The  (conditional)  period  risk-free  rate  r,(k,  z)  is then  determined  by 
(1+ rtdk, 4) = Pb(;  z)  *  (5)  > 
In  this  environment,  the  equity  security  represents  title  to  an  infinite  stream 
of  dividends,  d(k,  z),  defined  by 
d(k,z)  =f(k,n)z-nf,(k,n)z-i=c(k,z)  -w(k,z),  (6) 
where  w(  ) denotes  the  period  aggregate  wage  bill. 
Accordingly,  the  (conditional)  price  of  the  equity  security  (the  market 
portfolio)  is defined  recursively  by the  equation 
p,( k,  z)  = pj-  “@$  --;‘)  [d(k,z’)  +Pe(k’,z’)]Q(z,dz’).  (7) 
9 
It  follows  that  the  conditional  expected  return  on  the  market  portfolio, 
reck,  z),  is defined  by 
re(k,z)  =/ 
[ 
p,(  k’,  z’)  + d( k’,  z’) 
&(k,  z) 
-1 
given  k’ = (1 -  S)k  + i(k,  z). 
1 
Q<z,dz'), 
For  this  model  -  and  those  to  follow  -  we  have  adopted  an  asset  pricing 
perspective  similar  to  that  of  Lucas  (1978).  That  is, the  specification  of  the 
economy  and  the  notion  of  equilibrium  are  used  to  generate  a  sequence  of 
dividends  for  the  shareholder.  We  then  price  this  (time-stationary)  dividend 
stream  as though  it were  an  ‘exogenous’  dividend  process  as per  some  Lucas 
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We  next  consider  a modified  (Walrasian)  model  with  nonconvexities  in the 
representative  agent’s  choice  set. 
3.2.  Hansen’s  indivisible labor  economy 
In  the  most  elegant  Walrasian  solution  to  the  employment  variability 
puzzle  offered  to  date,  Hansen  (1985)  models  an  economy  with  a  restricted 
labor-leisure  choice.  In  particular,  he  proposes  to  take  account  of  the  fact 
that  real  world  workers  cannot  continuously  adjust  their  working  time,  but 
are  generally  limited  to working  full time  or not  at all. The  nonconvexity  such 
indivisibilities  introduce  in the  agents’  consumption  sets  is avoided  by assum- 
ing  that  households  choose  among  lotteries  specifying  the  probability  of 
working  full  time.  Such  lotteries  implicitly  define  the  contracts  exchanged 
between  firms  and  workers.  Assuming  a  log-additive  period  utility  function, 
u( c, 1) = log c + B log 1,  B>  0, 
Hansen  (1985)  shows  that  the  period  preferences  defined  over  consumption 
and  lotteries  (indexed  by  the  probability  of  working  full  time,  say  no  hours, 
n,  <  1) are  represented  by 
u(c,l)  =logc+Btlog(l-n,), 
where  5 denotes  the  probability  of working  full  time. 
Given  this  transformation,  the  dynamic  time  path  of  the  decentralized 
economy  can  be  expressed  as the  solution  to  the  problem 
subject  to 
k t+1  =k,(l-6)  +i,, 
n, =&no, 
k,  given, 
where  the  notation  is as in problem  (1). The  necessary  first-order  conditions 
for  problem  (91, again  under  very  general  conditions  [see  Hansen  (1985)1, are 516  J.-P.  Danthine  et al., Equity premium  and  income  risk 
given  by 
5:  u,(c,l-8n,)f*(k,Sn,)  =U*(c~1-5%)~  (10) 
i:  u,(c,l-5nc)  =P_/Ur(c’,l  -(‘no) 
x[f(kyn,)z’+  (1 -s)]Q(z,dz’).  (11) 
This  indivisibility  feature  substantially  alters  the  time  paths  of  the  various 
state  variables  relative  to  the  canonical  model  of  section  3.1:  for  the  same 
shock  distribution,  output,  investment,  and  hours  are  more  variable,  the 
latter  especially  so as compared  to  the  variation  in productivity. 
The  general  form  of the  relevant  asset  pricing  equations  is unchanged  from 
the  canonical  model: 
Pe(k,zt)  =pl  ul(c  l_,cno)  ul(c”l  -gno)  [d(k’,z’)  +P&V,z’)]Q(z,dz’). 
(13) 
But  with  the  behavior  of  the  consumption  and  capital  stock  series  differing 
significantly  from  the  canonical  case,  we  would  expect  the  actual  values  of 
these  quantities  to  change  as a result. 
While  retaining  our  emphasis  on  the  link  between  macroeconomic  and 
financial  variables,  we  lastly  consider  a non-Walrasian  model  formulation. 
3.3.  A  non-Walrasian  model  with labor  contracting 
For  this  economy,  equilibrium  will not  be  optimal  and,  as a result,  cannot 
be  expressed  as the  solution  to  a maximization  problem  as per  (1) or  (9). The 
equilibrium  must  therefore  be  constructed  from  an  examination  of  the 
problems  confronting  the  various  agents  in  the  economy.  For  this  reason, 
our  model  description  is necessarily  more  detailed  than  those  of  sections  3.1 
and  3.2.  _ 
3.3.1.  Firms 
We  hypothesize  an  economy  with  a large  number  of  identical  firms.  Firms 
are  owned  by  infinitely-lived  dynasties  of  shareholders  and  undertake  all J.-P.  Danthine  et  al.,  Equity  premium  and  income  risk  517 
investment  and  hiring  decisions3  All  firms  produce  the  unique  commodity 
with  the  same  constant  returns-to-scale  technology  as described  by a produc- 
tion  function  of  the  form  f(K,  NP, NJz,  where  K  represents  an  individual 
firm’s  capital  stock,  z  is the  economy-wide  shock  to  technology  common  to 
all  firms,  and  IV,, and  N,,  respectively,  denote  firm  levels  of  primary  and 
secondary  labor  employed.  (More  on  this  distinction  presently.)  Firm  owners 
(stockholders)  receive  the  residual  profits  from  production,  i.e.,  the  value  of 
output  net  of  the  wage  bill  and  taxes.  We  write  dK,  k,  z)  to  represent  the 
thus  defined  profit  function  of  a firm  owner  with  individual  capital  K,  when 
the  state  of the  economy  is summarized  by the  aggregate  level  of capital  stock 
k  and  the  technology  shock  z.  With  this  notation,  the  representative  share- 
holder’s  consumption  and  savings  decisions  are  assumed  to  solve  the  follow- 
ing problem: 
subject  to 
(14) 
K t+l=(l-a)K,+-I,, 
K,  given. 
3.3.2.  Workers  in the primary  sector 
Labor  services  are  provided  by  a  stationary  population  of  workers  where 
each  supplies  one  unit  of labor  inelastically  in each  period  of  his life (there  is 
no  disutility  to  work).  A  distinctive  feature  of  our  model  is the  assumption 
that  workers  do  not  have  access  to  financial  markets:  they  do  not  own  shares 
in  firms  nor  can  they  either  borrow  or  lend.  While  this  may  appear  as  a 
somewhat  extreme  assumption,  it  is made  in  the  spirit  of  the  following  two 
observations.  First,  workers’  main  wealth  is  in  the  form  of  their  human 
capital.  Yet  human  capital  cannot  collateralize  loans  in  modern  economies. 
Second,  a large  fraction  of  the  population  does  not  own  stocks.  Mankiw  and 
Zeldes  (19911, in  fact,  report  that  for  the  U.S.  economy  only  one  quarter  of 
all families  own  stocks. 
The  hypothesis  of  restricted  access  effectively  prevents  an  optimal  alloca- 
tion  of risks via financial  markets:  workers  in this world  consume  their  period 
3We  intend  that  the  infinitely-lived  dynasty  be  a  proxy  for  a  family  for  which  each  generation 
internalizes  the  utility  of  its  heirs.  Barro  (1984)  demonstrates  that  such  an  organization  will 
behave  collectively  like  the  infinitely-lived  agent  we  postulate. 518  J.-P.  Danthine  et  al.,  Equity  premium  and  income  risk 
income. 4,5 Modern  economies,  however,  have  developed  substitute  mecha- 
nisms  for  smoothing  consumption.  In  this  paper,  we  shall  focus  on  the  labor 
market  and  related  institutions  as  instruments  for  doing  so.  One  of  our 
primary  objectives  will  be  to  demonstrate  that  this  enlarged  role  of  labor 
institutions  and  arrangements  is not  without  consequences  for  the  dynamics 
of  the  economy. 
Two  types  of  relationships  between  firms  and  workers  are  postulated. 
Workers  in  the  primary  sector  benefit  from  a  life-long  association  with  the 
firm.  They  are  permanent  members  of  the  organization  or  ‘insiders’  and  the 
nature  of  their  contract  with  the  firm  is such  that  in  exchange  for  supplying 
one  unit  of  labor  each  period  of  their  working  life,  workers  receive  compen- 
sation  which  is considerably  less  variable  than  their  period  marginal  utility 
and,  in  fact,  corresponds  to  an  ex  post  efficient  allocation  of  income  risk 
between  primary  sector  workers  and  firm  owners. 
The  compensation  received  by the  primary  workers  must  thus  be  such  that 
the  ratio  of  their  ex post  marginal  utility  of  consumption  to  the  firm  owners’ 
marginal  utility  of  consumption  is  a  constant,  8,  across  all  states  of  nature 
and  across  time.  A  value  for  the  parameter  8  was  chosen  so  that  the 
expected  utility  of firm  owners  under  this  risk  sharing  arrangement  exceeded 
their  expected  utility  under  a pure  Walrasian  set-up.  This  allows  us to  assert 
that  both  firms  and  workers  would  voluntarily  enter  into  such  arrangements. 
Summing  up  this  discussion,  the  life-time  contract  between  primary  sector 
workers  and  firm  owners  implies  that  each  firm  will employ  its  share  of  the 
primary  sector  workforce  at  a compensation  level  w,(K,  k, z)  implicitly  given 
by 
u,[ydKkz)]  =Q[C(Kk,z)],  (15) 
where  C(K,  k,  z)  solves  problem  (14)  and  u(  1 denotes  the  period  utility  of 
(both  types  of) workers.‘j 
Using  the  language  of  the  contracting  literature  we  assume,  in effect,  that 
the  firm  is contractually  bound  in perpetuity  to  the  primary  workers  with  the 
4As  a  consequence  of  the  no  borrowing  or  lending  assumption,  the  worker’s  optimal  consump- 
tion  problem  is  a  static  one.  We  thus  do  not  need  to  be  specific  about  their  life  duration.  For 
simplicity,  we  assume  they  live  forever  as  well. 
‘The  fact  that  workers  consume  their  incomes  allows  us  to  introduce  agent  heterogeneity  in  a 
convenient  way  without  the  challenge  of  having  to  keep  track  of  wealth  distributions:  only  one 
agent  effectively  accumulates  wealth.  This  heterogeneity  is nonetheless  nontrivial  and  the  choice 
of  preference  parameters  for  the  workers  has  a  substantial  impact  on  the  properties  of 
equilibrium. 
6We  may  interpret  eq.  (15)  as  suggesting  that  permanent  workers  are  viewed  by  the  firm 
owner  as  ‘part  of  the  family’,  in  such  a way  that  their  utility  is  included  directly  in  the  firm  owner 
objective  function:  in  effect,  the  period  utility  function  of  the  firm  owner  is  given  by  u(c)  + 
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form  of  the  (time-invariant)  contract  defined  by the  risk  sharing  rule  implicit 
in  eq.  (15).  Primary  workers’  consumption  volatility  is  reduced  within  the 
period  and  intertemporally.  The  latter  smoothing  comes  about  from  the  fact 
that  shareholders  are  able  to  smooth  their  consumption  intertemporally  and 
that  the  relationship  defined  by  eq.  (15)  de  facto  imparts  some  of  this 
smoothing  to  the  primary  workers.  In  effect,  the  contract  serves  to  substitute 
for  a  securities  market  in  which  primary  workers  and  shareholders  trade 
risks.’ 
3.3.3.  Secondary  set tor workers 
At  the  other  extreme,  workers  in  the  secondary  or  ‘casual’  sector  do  not 
have  tenure  with  a firm,  but  rather  only  a short-term  relationship  which  may 
be  renewed  or  not  depending  on  the  realization  of  the  firm’s  productivity 
shock. 
In  this  paper,  we  assume  that  workers  of  both  types  are  of  equal  measure 
which  we  normalize  to  be  one.  Firms  take  the  wage  level  of  secondary 
workers  as  given.  Their  hiring  is determined  by  the  standard  condition  that 
marginal  productivity  should  cover  the  real  wage.  Anticipating  the  fact  that 
an equilibrium  can  be characterized  as if there  were  only one  firm (employing 
the  economy-wide  stock  of  capital  and  all  employed  workers),  the  level  of 
employment  of  secondary  sector  workers,  n&k,  z),  will be  given  by 
w,(k,z)  =f3[k,1,n,(k,z)lzy  (16) 
where  w&k, z)  is the  wage  level  of  secondary  workers. 
Given  imperfect  capital  markets,  Walrasian  wage  determination  in  the 
secondary  labor  market  [i.e.,  w*(k,  z)  =f3(k,  l,l)z]  will  entail  considerable 
income  variation.  All modern  economies  have  adopted  a variety  of redistribu- 
tive  schemes;  e.g.,  minimum  wage  laws,  welfare  payments,  unemployment 
compensation,  etc.,  which  we  interpret  as having  the  objective  of  preventing 
extremes  of  income  variation.  Following  Dreze  (19891, we  capture  the  effect 
of  these  institutions  by  postulating  the  existence  of  a  system  combining  a 
socially  determined  wage  floor  with  unemployment  compensation  financed  by 
a lump-sum  tax on  firms’ profits.  We  intend  for  this  set-up  to  reflect  not  only 
7Could an  arrangement  between  firm  owners  and  permanent  workers  with  a sharing  parame- 
ter  0  changing  over  time  be  a Pareto-superior  arrangement  to  the  one  we  have  specified?  The 
answer  is no  and  for  the  following  reason:  a constant  ~9  implies  effectively  that  the  intertemporal 
marginal  role  of  substitution  of  permanent  workers  and  firm  owners  will be  the  same,  and  this 
condition  is  necessary  to  a  Pareto-optimal  allocation.  With  O’s changing  through  time,  the 
marginal  rates  of  substitution  will  differ  implying  further  gains  to  intertemporal  exchanges 
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what  prevails  in  that  segment  of  the  labor  market  directly  affected  by 
minimum  wage  restrictions  but  also  what  prevails  in  all  those  professions 
where  union  activity  significantly  affects  the  compensation  level  of  workers 
(thereby  preventing,  in  certain  circumstances,  a  full  equilibration  of  the 
corresponding  market). 
We  shall  assume  that  the  wage  floor  w,(k,  z)  and  the  transfer  payments 
t(k,  z)  to  the  unemployed  (if  any)  are  determined,  on  a  state-contingent 
basis,  as the  solution  to the  maximization  of a weighted  sum of agents’  period 
utilities.  For  every  (k,  z),  w,(k,  z)  and  t(k,  z)  solve 
f”yW(k  k  z)) + u(wp<  k, z)) + n,( k, Z)U(  wf) 
Wf, 
+(I  -QLz))u(t), 
subject  to 
w,2  t,  1 rn,(k,z). 
(17) 
In  problem  (17)  above,  n&k,  z)  is  determined  by  eq.  (16)  while  w&k,  z) 
satisfies  eq.  (15).  The  parameter  h  is the  firm  owner’s  weight  factor  in  the 
government  objective  function.  It  will  be  calibrated  so  as  to  insure  that 
capital  income’s  share  in  the  model  economy  approximates  its  real-world 
counterpart.  The  wage  paid  to  the  secondary  workers  is thus  given  by 
w,(k, z) = max{w,(k,  z),w*(k,  z)),  (18) 
where  w*(k,  z)  is the  Walrasian  determined  wage.  Problem  (17) is appealing 
because  on  a  period-by-period  basis  it  produces  an  allocation  of  resources 
(with  unemployment)  which  is socially  preferred  to  the  Walrasian  solution  of 
the  secondary  labor  market.  Of  course,  (17)  presupposes  -  some  would 
argue,  with  a  fair  amount  of  descriptive  realism  -  that  the  government  acts 
myopically  by not  taking  account  of  the  effect  of  its wage  floor  policy  on  the 
investment  function  of  the  firm  owners.  Note  that  some  form  of  myopia  has 
to  be  assumed  on  the  part  of  government  or  society  if a nonoptimal  level  of 
employment  is to  be  rationalized  in the  context  of  this  model. 
3.3.4. Equilibrium 
Our  set-up  can  now  be  summarized  as  follows.  Firm  owners  determine 
their  investment  policy  I(  1 by  solving  problem  (14)  taking  as  a  given  the 
state-contingent  wage  of  the  secondary  workers,  w&k, z),  and  the  state-con- 
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They  are  also  committed  through  an  indefinite  contract  to  employing  their 
share  (K/k)  of  permanent  workers  with  a  compensation  scheme  given  by 
w&K, k, 2). 
These  constraints  are  subsumed  in  the  definition  of  a  representative 
firm-owner’s  profit, 
Note  that  optimal  risk  sharing  between  workers  and  shareholders  may 
force  the  residual  profit  to  differ  from  the  return  on  capital  even  in  the 
presence  of  constant  returns.  Thus  we  view  shareholders  as  entrepreneurs 
who  contribute  whatever  capital  they  have  to  the  production  process  every 
period  and  who  receive  in  return  the  residual  profit  after  wages  and  taxes 
have  been  paid. 
Taking  the  investment  policy  as  a  given  -  thus  ignoring  the  impact  of  its 
policies  on  the  investment  rule  -  the  government  imposes  a wage  floor  w,(*> 
and  a  tax  (and  transfer)  policy  t(k,  z).  In  effect  we  assume  that  society 
precommits  itself  to  a social  contract  -  summarized  by problem  (17)  -  which 
is  invariant  across  all  future  time  periods  and  which  benefits  secondary 
workers.  As  in  the  case  of  primary  workers,  the  (social)  contract  is  not 
renegotiated  on  a period-by-period  basis  and  in that  sense  may  be  viewed  as 
an  element  of  the  constitution  of  the  society.  This  assumes  a precommitment 
technology  which  differentiates  our  formulation  from  that  of,  e.g.,  Kydland 
and  Prescott  (1977)  and  Chari  et  al. (1989). 
In  equilibrium,  individual  and  aggregate  quantities  coincide:  K = k,  I’$, = 
np,  T(k,  k,  z)  = t(k,  2).  (1 -n&k,  z)),  and  N, = 12,. Writing  in  a  natural 
fashion  Z(k,  k,  z)  = i(k,  z),  C(k,  k,  z)  = dk,  z),  and  w&k, k,  z)  = w&k,  z), 
we  are  now  in a position  to  state  our  definition  of  equilibrium. 
Definition.  An  equilibrium  in  this  model  is an  investment  policy  i( *  1 and  a 
government  policy  [wf(.),t(.)]  such  that,  given  i(s),  [w&e),t(-11  solves  (17) 
for  all  (k,  z),  while  given  [w,(e),  t(e)],  X.1  is the  solution  to  (14) with  profit 
defined  in (19). 
Existence  of  equilibrium  can,  in  general,  be  guaranteed  provided  the 
technology  and  preferences  satisfy  certain  substantially  restrictive  assump- 
tions,  which  are  detailed  in  Danthine  and  Donaldson  (1991b).  A  brief 
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The  necessary  first-order  condition  for  problem  (14) is given  by 
= p/v,( 7r( k’, 2’)  -  i( k’, 2’)) 
xf,(k’,l,n,(k’,z’))z’+(l-G)Q(z,dz’).  (20) 
Let  d  denote  the  set  of  bounded  continuous  functions  defined  on  R+X R+, 
and  for  i(k,  z)  E -zz?,  define  the  operator  Y(  1: 8-,  BX 4~  k by 
r(i(k,z))  =  (w,(k,z),w,(k,z>,t(k,z)),  (21) 
where  this  latter  triple  of  functions  solves  (17)  together  with  (16)  and  Cl@, 
given  i(k,  z).  We  next  define  a second  operator  31  8X 8X  d+  -6'  by 
~(~,(k,z),w,(k,z),t(k,z))  =i(k,z),  (22) 
where  i(k,  z> solves  eq.  (20) given (w&k,  z), w&k, z), t(k,  z)).  Equilibrium  for 
this  economy  can  then  be  expressed  as a function  i^(k, z)  E d  for  which 
Z(k,z)=9-(l(k,z))=.Y(Y(i^(k,z))),  (23) 
i.e.,  $k,  z)  is a fixed  point  of  the  operator  F(  ). 
A simple  iterative  scheme,  which  generated  a sequence  {i,(k,  z)),  i(k,  z)  = 
F(i,_,(k,  z)),  allowed  us to compute  the  equilibrium  i^(k,  z)  as the  limit of a 
monotone  sequence  of  functions. 
Since  workers  are  prohibited  from  financial  market  participation,  the 
expression  for  the  price  of a one-period  risk-free  discount  bond  (and  thus  the 
risk-free  rate)  as well  as the  return  on  the  market  portfolio  are  defined  only 
with respect  to shareholder  preferences  and  savings  behavior.  Accordingly,  the 
state  conditional  price  of  a one-period  risk-free  discount  bond  is given  by 
Pb(k,z)  =~lu:~~~~‘:;:)Q(z,dz’). 
1  ’  (24) 
In  a  like  fashion,  the  (conditional)  price  p&k,  z> of  the  equity  security  is 
defined  recursively  by the  equation 
p,(k,z)  =Pf$~(;::;:’  [WY)  +pe(k',z')]Q<z,dz'), 
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where  d(k,  z),  the  dividend,  is defined  by 
d(k,z)  =f(k,l,n,(k,z))z-wWp(k,z)  -wJk,z)  -i(k,z).  (26) 
As  our  notation  clearly  indicates  the  expressions  for  the  pricing  relation- 
ships  and  thus  the  rate  of  return  representations  are  conditional  on  the  state 
of  the  economy  (k,  z).  This  is true,  not  only  for  the  non-Walrasian  economy 
but  also  for  the  Walrasian  economies  considered  earlier  [cf.  eqs.  (12)  and 
(13)I. For  all of  these  expressions  the  unconditional  mean  risk-free  rate  and 
return  to  the  market  portfolio  are  defined  by,  respectively, 
Er,  = //  r,(k,  z)G(dk,dz),  (27) 
Er,  = //  r,(k,z)G(dk,dz),  (28) 
where  G(dk,  dz)  denotes  the  joint  stationary  distribution  on  aggregate  capi- 
tal  and  the  shock  to  technology.  Note  that  G(dk,dz)  will differ  substantially 
for  our  three  model  formulations. 
3.4. Anatomy  of  the risk premium 
Let  m(k’,  z’lk,  z)  = q(c(k’,  z’))/u,(c(k,  z>) [or  uI(c(k’,  z’))/u,(c(k,  z)),  as 
the  case  may  be].  Then  eqs.  (4)  and  (6) (Walrasian  model),  or  (12)  and  (13) 
(indivisible  labor  model),  or (24) and  (25) (non-Walrasian  model)  can,  respec- 
tively,  be  written  as* 
1 =PR,(k,z)lm(k’,z’lk,z)Q(z,dz’),  (29) 
1 =P/m(k’,  z’lk,  z)R,(  k’,  z’lk,  z>Q(  z,dz’),  (30) 
where 
&(k,z)  =  1 +r,(k,z) 
and 
R,(  k’,  z’lk,  z)  = 
p,(  k’,  z’)  + d( k’,  z’) 
p,(  k’,  z’)  * 
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From  (30), we  obtain 
Substituting  l/R,@,  z)  for  the  first term  in eq.  (31) and  rearranging  gives the 
following  expression  for  the  conditional  premium  risk  R&k,  z): 
R,(k,  2) = pep,  z’lk, z>Q(z,dz')  -&,(k,  z) 
i 
q( c( k’, z’))  = -pR,(k,z)COV  u  (c(k  z))  d-e(Kz’lkz)  *  (32) 
1  7  I 
In accordance  with  our  later  hypotheses,  let  us assume  that  U(C,  1) is of the 
form  U(C,  I) = C(c) + g(l).  Approximate  C(c) by its second-order  Taylor  series 
expansion;  i.e.,  1?(c) = UC  -  (b/2)c2  for  constants  a > 0,  b > 0.  Noting  that 
the  coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion,  I/J, is given  by  (be/a  -  bc),  eq.  (34) 
can  then  be  written  as 
RP( k,  2)  =  _PRb(  k,  z)cov 
a -/X(k’,z’) 
a -bc(k,z) 
=  -P&(k,z)  ._b;;k  z) 
i  ’  1 
XCOV(C(k’,z’),re(k’,z’Ik,z)) 
=PR,(L,z)(  a :;c;;,;)) 
r,( k’, z’lk, z) I 
x cov 
c( k’,  z’) 
c(k, z) 
c(k',z') 
R&W  =P%,(k,z)p  c(k  =>  ,r,(k',z'Ik,z)  i  ’ 
(33) 
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where  the  latter  terms  represent  the  standard  deviations  of  the  indicated 
series.  It  follows  that  the  unconditional  risk  premium,  R,,  is given  by  (to  a 
good  approximation) 
*(+(c(k’,z’)/c(k,z))a(r,(k’,z’Ik,z))G(dk,dz).  (35) 
This  expression  makes  clear  the  principal  (endogenous)  determinants  of 
the  risk premium:  the  standard  deviation  of the  consumption  growth  rate,  the 
standard  deviation  of the  return  on  the  equity  security,  and  the  correlation  of 
the  consumption  growth  rate  with  the  market  return.  Our  analysis  of  the 
financial  performance  of  our  three  model  paradigms  thus  naturally  focuses 
on  these  three  quantities. 
4.  Model  performance 
For  the  canonical  and  indivisible  labor  supply  models,  Gary  Hansen 
provided  us  with  the  equilibrium  decision  rules.  These  rules  were  used  to 
construct  a time  series  of  the  relevant  macrovariables  -  consumption,  invest- 
ment,  etc.,  and  it  is  with  respect  to  these  stationary  time  series  that  the 
financial  and  macro  statistics  were  computed.  In  the  case  of  the  non-walra- 
sian  model,  we  followed  the  procedure  noted  earlier  to  obtain  the  equilib- 
rium  i(k,  z).  Given  the  equilibrium  investment  function  i(k,  z),  all  the 
various  time  series  were  easily  generated. 
With  regard  to  the  choice  of  functional  forms,  the  period  utility  function 
for  the  canonical  and  indivisible  labor  economies,  following  Hansen  (1985), 
was  chosen  to  be  u(c,  1) = log c + B  log I,  B  =  3;  for  the  non-Walrasian 
model  u(c)  = log c  (profit  earner  utility).  For  the  latter  model  it  was  also 
assumed  that  workers  are  more  risk-averse  than  entrepreneurs.  To  accommo- 
date  this  assumption,  the  period  utility  function  common  to  both  old  and 
young  workers  was  chosen  to  be  c ‘-e/l  -  $,  with  I,!J  = 7, in line  with  earlier 
microstudies,  notably  Dreze  (1981). 
As  for  production  technologies,  f(k,  n) = /c~Pz’-~, with  (Y  = 0.36,  for  the 
canonical  and  indivisible  labor  models.  A  natural  adaptation  of  this  general 
form  was  chosen  for  the  non-Walrasian  economy:  f(k,  rzP, n,)  = 
Mkan~(l-U),~‘-YX1--LI),  with  u =  i  and  cx  = 0.36. The  parameter  M  is purely  a 
scale  parameter;  it was chosen  to  fix the  level  of  unemployment  at 5 percent 
which  appears  reasonable  for  the  U.S.  economy.  As  noted  earlier  the 
parameter  8 was determined  entirely  endogenously  within  the  model  such  as 
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labor  contracts  to  the  old  as  being  the  same.  Lastly,  the  parameter  A 
determines  the  distribution  of  income  between  profit  earners  and  workers. 
For  all the  models,  /3 was fixed  at 0.99 (which  implicitly  defines  the  model 
period  as  corresponding  to  a  quarter).  As  to  the  assumed  shock  process, 
.z’  = ~$2  + E:, with  4  = 0.95  and  E: N Normal  (p  = 0.05,  (T  = 0.00712)  for  the 
canonical  and  indivisible  labor  models.  In  the  non-Walrasian  formulation,  z 
was required  to  follow  a two-state  shock  process  with  transition  probabilities 
given by 
21  22 
21 
i 
77  l-77 
z2  1-T  17  1 . 
The  parameters  zr,  z2,  and  n  were  given  the  values  of  1.025,  0.975,  and 
0.975,  respectively.  Under  this  assignment  the  persistence  and  mean  of  the 
two-state  process  coincide  with  that  of  the  autoregressive  process  above, 
while  the  standard  deviation  is approximately  half  as great.  Relative  to  the 
Walrasian  models,  the  non-Walrasian  formulation  consistently  requires  a 
lower  shock  variation  to  achieve  the  same  standard  deviation  of  output. 
We  are  now  positioned  to  review  the  results  of  our  numerical  study, 
4.1.  Macrovariables:  Comparative  analysis 
In  table  3 we  summarize  the  performance  of  the  three  models  with  regard 
to  the  basic  macroeconomic  aggregates. 
As  in U.S.  data,  investment  is more  variable  than  output,  which  is in turn 
more  variable  than  total  consumption  for  all three  models.  The  presence  of 
Table  3 
Standard  deviation  in  percent  (a),  correlation  with  output  (b).a 
Canonical 
model 
(a)  (b) 
Indivisible 
labor  model 
(a)  (b) 
Non-Walrasian 
model 
(a)  (b) 
output 
Total  consumption 
(i)  Shareholder  consumption 
(ii)  Total  worker  consumption 
Investment 
Capital  stock 
Total  hours 
Average  productivity 
Unemployment  rate 
1.35  1.00  1.76  1.00 
0.42  0.89  0.51  0.87 
4.24  0.99  5.71  0.99 
0.36  0.06  0.47  0.05 
0.70  0.98  1.35  0.98 
0.68  0.98  0.50  0.87 
1.76  1 .oo 
0.34  0.69 
5.36  0.98 
0.22  0.10 
6.08  0.99 
0.54  0.03 
1.26  0.98 
0.61  0.91 
5 percent 
aThe  model  statistics  were  computed  from  detrended  data  using  the  procedure  of  Hodrick 
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non-Walrasian  features  is clearly  not  inconsistent  with  the  most  basic  charac- 
teristics  of  the  business  cycle.  Nevertheless,  in  this  as  in  the  other  two 
models,  there  is evidence  of  excessive  consumption  smoothing.  With  regard 
to  the  relative  variability  of  hours  vis-a-vis  average  productivity,  both  the 
invisible  labor  and  non-Walrasian  models  perform  much  better  than  the 
canonical  model.  Indeed,  the  employment-productivity  variability  paradox 
can  be  viewed  as solved  in both  these  formulations. 
Shareholder  consumption  in  the  non-Walrasian  model  is  seen  to  vary 
proportionately  much  more  than  worker  consumption.  This  is to be  expected 
in  light  of  the  fact  that  workers  are  substantially  more  risk-averse  than 
shareholders  and  that,  as a consequence,  substantial  income  variation  will be 
transferred  from  workers  of  both  vintages  to  shareholders  in  regions  of 
unemployment.  Mankiw  and  Zeldes  (1991)  provide  evidence  for  this  asser- 
tion  by examining  the  ratio  of  the  standard  deviation  of consumption  growth 
for  shareholders  to  that  of  nonshareholders,  and  find  it  to  be  about  1.5 for 
the  data  they  examine.  In  our  model  economy,  the  same  ratio  assumes  a 
value  of  1.6 (unfiltered  data).  This  statistic  has  no  counterpart  in  the  other 
model  formulations. 
4.3.  Financial  quantities:  New  puzzles 
Table  4  provides  a  statistical  summary  of  the  performance  of  the  three 
models  along  the  relevant  financial  dimensions. 
The  first  columns  of  table  4 record  the  results  obtained  for  the  Walrasian 
model.  The  equity  premium  is extremely  small,  0.03  percent:  the  annualized 
risk-free  rate  is not  different  from  the  average  return  on  the  market  at  4.1 
Table  4 
Summary  financial  statistics,  annualized,  in  percent;  unconditional  mean  values  (a), 







p(r,,  MWb 
p(r,,  MIWb 
Walrasian 
economy 
(a)  fb) 
4.1  0.4 
4.1  0.2 






Indivisible  labor  Non-Walrasian 
economy  economy 
(a)  (b)  (a)  (b) 
4.15  0.48  4.56  0.84 
4.11  0.20  3.98  0.80 
0.04  0.44  0.58  0.06 
0.0001”  0.0007” 
0.71%  4.3% 
0.67  0.06 
-0.15  -  0.05 
-  0.20  -  0.05 
aTheoretically  zero  for  a  stationary  economy. 
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percent.  This  means  that  the  return  on  the  market  is  too  low  while  the 
risk-free  return  is too  high.  The  small  equity  premium  is due  partly  to  the 
excessive  consumption  smoothing  alluded  to  earlier:  the  variability  of  con- 
sumption  growth  is  significantly  lower  than  what  is  observed  in  reality. 
Another  more  striking  source  of the  model’s  failure  is its inability  to replicate 
the  large  variability  observed  for  the  market  return  -  the  standard  deviation 
of  re  is 0.8  percent  in  the  artificial  economy  as  opposed  to  16.5 percent  in 
reality. 
The  third  and  fourth  columns  of  table  4 demonstrate  that  the  indivisible 
labor  model  does  not  represent  a significant  improvement  over  the  Walrasian 
paradigm.  The  equity  premium  remains  essentially  zero  (4  hundredths  of  1 
percent)  and  for  basically  the  same  reason:  consumption  growth  variation  is 
too  small  and  the  market  return  does  not  vary  nearly  enough  (1 percent  as 
against  16.5 percent  for  real  world  data).  Note  that  in  both  models  consid- 
ered  so far  the  variability  of  the  risk-free  rate  is too  small  as well:  approxi- 
mately  4 tenths  of  1 percent  vis-a-vis  5.7 percent  in reality. 
The  results  obtained  for  the  non-Walrasian  model  are  closer  to  real-world 
observations  along  all  dimensions  but  one.  The  market  return  is larger,  the 
risk-free  rate  lower,  and  the  equity  premium  increases  to  0.6 percent.  While 
this  is  ten  times  too  small,  it  is  nevertheless  considerably  better  than  the 
previous  two  models.  It  is also  higher  (0.2 percent)  than  the  maximum  value 
obtained  by  Mehra  and  Prescott  (1985).  The  improvement  in  the  results  is 
mainly  due  to  the  increase  in  the  standard  deviation  of  the  growth  rate  in 
consumption.  This  is made  possible  by the  fact  that  the  relevant  consumption 
aggregate  for  the  non-Walrasian  model  formulation  is  not  aggregate  con- 
sumption,  but  rather  the  consumption  of  stockholders  alone.  The  standard 
deviation  of the  return  on  the  equity  security  is also  higher  than  in the  other 
two  models.  Nevertheless,  it  remains  about  twenty  times  too  small.  On  the 
other  hand  -  and  somewhat  surprisingly  -  the  correlation  of  the  return  on 
the  market  with  the  growth  rate  in consumption  falls. 
It  thus  appears  that  the  equity  premium  puzzle  remains  fundamentally 
robust  to  this  class  of  models.  It  could  not  be  otherwise  for  the  Walrasian 
and  indivisible  labor  models,  as  they  fall  entirely  within  the  framework  of 
Mehra  and  Prescott  (1985).  Our  analysis  serves  principally  to  suggest  addi- 
tional  sources  of  model  falsification.  In  the  non-Walrasian  formulation, 
however,  a  new  modeling  element  was  introduced  in  the  form  of  the 
distinction  implied  between  stockholders’  and  nonstockholders’  consumption. 
But  despite  the  clear  improvement  this  distinction  makes  possible  vis-a-vis 
the  standard  deviation  of consumption  growth,  the  failure  of the  model  along 
the  other  dimensions  prevents  a full  resolution  of the  equity  premium  puzzle. 
In  particular,  the  observed  volatility  of  the  market  return  constitutes  as 
much  of  a  puzzle  from  the  standpoint  of  these  theories.  Without  major 
alterations  to  the  assumed  production  technology,  we  doubt  that  RBC J.-P.  Danthine  et  al.,  Equity  premium  and  income  risk  529 
models  will  be  able  to  replicate  the  observation  that  the  market  return  is 
substantially  more  volatile  than  the  aggregate  product. 
The  basis  of  this  assertion  is most  clearly  seen  in  the  case  of  a  canonical 
model.  Under  the  customary  Cobb-Douglas  technology  specification  (with 
y =f(k,  n)z  = !Pnl-“z): 
With  the  gross  return  on  the  equity  security  given  by 
R,(k’,z’lk,z)  =P[f#‘,n’)z’+(l  -a>] 
= aPy’/k’  + P( 1 -  6)  3 
we  can  assert  that  in the  stationary  state 
var( R,)  = var(  le)  = ,*p*  var(  y/k), 
(37) 
where  these  are  to  be  interpreted  as  unconditional  variances.  For  the 
equality  to  be  satisfied,  with  (Y  = 0.36  and  p  = 0.99,  the  var(y/k)  must  be 
nearly  eight  times  larger  than  var(r,),  which  is not  observed.  Sufficient  return 
volatility  will be  possible  only  if either  the  fundamental  underlying  technol- 
ogy  or  the  relationship  of  equity  returns  to  the  marginal  productivity  of 
capital  changes  significantly. 
Furthermore,  all  three  RBC  models  considered  here  predict  a  risk-free 
rate  much  smoother  and  significantly  higher  than  what  is  inferred  from 
real-world  observations.  In  light  of  the  results  of  the  RBC  models  we  have 
examined  the  equity  premium  and  risk-free  rate  puzzles  are  intimately 
related:  if the  equity  premium  is too  small,  it is not  so much  the  result  of  an 
insufficient  market  return  but  rather  the  result  of  a  risk-free  rate  that  is too 
large.  This  assertion  is reinforced  by the  fact  that  all the  models  considered 
in  this  paper  are  stationary,  a  property  which  leads  to  understating  of  the 
risk-free  rate.  In a growing  economy,  future  consumption  will typically  exceed 
current  consumption.  Since  the  marginal  utility  of future  consumption  is less 
than  present  consumption,  real  interest  rates  will be  higher  on  average. 
To  conclude,  it  is of  interest  to  pose  the  following  question:  suppose  an 
outside  observer  were  to  mistake  our  heterogeneous  agent  economy  for  one 
in which  all decisions  are  undertaken  by a representative  agent.  What  level  of 
risk aversion  would  he  infer  as necessary  to generate  the  risk premium  of our 
model  given  the  behavior  of  its  aggregate  consumption  series?  We  can 
efficiently  provide  an  answer  to  this  question  by using  the  following  formula 530  J.-P.  Danthine  et al., Equity premium  and  income  risk 
Table  5 
Estimating  *.a 
Data  series  employed  *=1  *=3 
Profit  earner  consumption 
Total  consumption 
‘Other  parameters  as in table  4. 
0.41  1.54 
10.13  17.02 
of  Mankiw  and  Zeldes  (1991) or  Grossman  and  Shiller  (1982): 
E(r,(k,z)  -r,(k,z))=cClp(r,(k,z)  -rb(k,z),At(k,~)) 
-a(At(k,z)) 
YT(r,(k,z)  -r&w)),  (39) 
where  u  denotes  the  standard  deviation  of  the  indicated  time  series  and 
Ac^(k, z)  is defined  by 
2(k’,z’) 
c^(k,  z) 
-  1, 
with  c^(k, z)  measuring  either  shareholder  consumption  or  total  consumption. 
Since  this  formula  applies  strictly  to  a world  of  continuous  transactions,  it 
is necessary  to check  that  the  bias introduced  by a discrete  time  setting  is not 
too  serious  by  first  recovering  the  CRRA  of  stockholders  from  their  own 
consumption  series.  As  shown  in  the  first  line  of  table  5,  where  we  also 
computed  the  analogous  quantity  for  the  case  of  shareholder  rl, = 3, for  our 
model  economy  eq.  (39)  leads  to  understating  the  risk  aversion  parameter: 
3  (estimate)  = 0.41  instead  of  1 in  the  log(c)  case,  1.54  instead  of  3 in  the 
other  one.  This  gives  us  confidence  that  our  estimates  of  the  risk  aversion 
parameter  of the  representative  agent  can  be viewed  as lower  bounds  for  the 
actual  parameter  values. 
Now the  answer  to our  original  questions  is to be found  on  the  second  line 
of table  5, and  it is striking.  For  the  case  where  the  utility  of the  stockholders 
is logarithmic,  J) =  1, the  mistaken  outside  observer  would  conclude  that  the 
representative  agent  possessed  a  CRR4  exceeding  10. For  the  case  of  I) = 3, 
the  aggregate  consumption  data  would  lead  him  to  conclude  that  the  econ- 
omy  was  operating  according  to  the  wishes  of  a very  risk-averse  representa- 
tive  agent  with  a CRRA of  17 (the  risk premium  in this  case  is approximately 
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We  feel  this  result  best  illustrates  the  power  of  the  capital  and  labor 
market  frictions  we have  introduced  to  alter  the  riskiness  of the  environment 
facing  investors.  In  this  case,  furthermore,  the  (erroneous>  use  of  aggregate 
consumption  data  leads  to  inferring  a  societal  CRRA  which  substantially 
exceeds  the  CRRA of  either  of  the  economy’s  constitutent  group.  This  result 
suggests  that  caution  should  be  exercised  in  drawing  conclusions  about  the 
fundamental  validity  of the  CCAPM  from  implausible  estimates  of the  CRRA 
obtained  under  representative  agent  modeling  assumptions. 
5.  Summary  and  concluding  comments 
We  have  argued  that  CCAPM-related  financial  as well  as macroeconomic 
stylized  facts  should  be  used  to  test  RBC  models.  Such  cross-model  verifica- 
tion  is warranted  since  the  consumption  and  savings  decisions  of  the  same 
economic  agents  are  at  the  heart  of  both  paradigms  (CCAPM  and  RBC). 
This  exercise  reinforces  the  claim  made  elsewhere  [Danthine  and  Donaldson 
(1991b)l  that  non-Walrasian  types  of  frictions  are  not  only  compatible  with, 
but  also  improve  the  power  of,  RBC  models  to  replicate  observed  regulari- 
ties:  the  results  obtained  for  the  risk  sharing  model  are  closer  to  real  world 
observations  along  all dimensions  considered  but  one. 
It  remains,  however,  that  the  three  RBC  models  dealt  with  in  this  paper 
are  falsified  by financial  statistics.  To  the  equity  premium  and  risk-free  rate 
puzzles,  we  add  an  excess  volatility  puzzle:  the  essential  inability  of  these 
models  to  replicate  the  observation  that  the  market  return  is fundamentally 
more  volatile  than  the  national  product. 
Our  non-Walrasian  model  is one  with  agent  heterogeneity.  The  power  of 
the  risk shifting  mechanism  we have  analyzed  is made  clear  in recovering  the 
preferences  of  the  representative  agent  who  would  make  the  risk  premium 
obtained  in the  model  consistent  with  four  aggregate  consumption  series.  We 
get  an estimate  for  the  risk aversion  parameter  substantially  in excess  of what 
is  commonly  viewed  as  plausible.  The  estimate  is  also  substantially  higher 
than  the  risk aversion  parameter  of  either  constitutent  group  in our  economy. 
References 
Abel,  A.,  1990,  Asset  prices  under  habit  formation  and  catching  up  with  the  Jones,  American 
Economic  Review  Papers  and  Proceedings  80,  38-42. 
Aiyagari,  S.R.  and  M.  Gertler,  1991,  Asset  returns  with  transactions  costs  and  uninsured 
individual  risks,  Journal  of  Monetary  Economics  27,  311-332. 
Barro,  R.,  1984,  Are  government  bonds  net  wealth?,  Journal  of  Political  Economy  85,1095-1117. 
Breeden,  D.T.,  1979,  An  intertemporal  capital  asset  pricing  model  with  stochastic  consumption 
and  investment  opportunities,  Journal  of  Financial  Economics  7,  265-291. 
Brock,  W.A.,  1979,  An  integration  of  stochastic  growth  theory  and  the  theory  of  finance,  Part  I: 
The  growth  model,  in:  J.  Green  and  J.  Scheinkman,  eds.,  General  equilibrium,  growth,  and 
trade  (Academic  Press,  New  York,  NY). 532  J.-P.  Danthine  et al.,  Equity  premium  and  income  risk 
Brock,  W.A.,  1982,  Asset  prices  in  a  production  economy,  in:  J.J.  McCall,  ed.,  The  economics  of 
information  and  uncertainty  (University  of  Chicago  Press,  Chicago,  IL). 
Chari,  V.V.,  P.  Kehoe,  and  E.C.  Prescott,  1989,  Time  consistency  and  policy,  in:  R.  Barro,  ed., 
Modern  business  cycle  theory  (Harvard  University  Press,  Cambridge,  MA). 
Coleman,  W.J.,  1991,  Equilibrium  in  an  economy  with  capital  and  taxes  on  production,  Econo- 
metrica  59,  1091-1104. 
Constantinides,  G.M.,  1990,  Habit  formation:  A  resolution  of  the  equity  premium  puzzle, 
Journal  of  Political  Economy  98,  519-543. 
Cox,  J.,  J.  Ingersoll,  and  S.A.  Ross,  1985,  An  intertemporal  general  equilibrium  model  of  asset 
prices,  Econometrica  53,  363-384. 
Danthine,  J.P.  and  J.B.  Donaldson,  1990,  Efficiency  wages  and  the  business  cycle  puzzle, 
European  Economic  Review  34,  1275-1301. 
Danthine,  J.P.  and  J.B.  Donaldson,  1991a,  Risk  sharing,  the  minimum  wage,  and  the  business 
cycle,  in:  W.  Barnett,  B.  Cornet,  C.  d’Aspremont,  J.J.  Gabsewicz,  and  A.  Mas-Colell,  eds., 
Equilibrium  theory  and  applications  (Cambridge  University  Press,  Cambridge). 
Danthine,  J.P.  and  J.B.  Donaldson,  1991b,  Methodological  and  empirical  issues  in  real  business 
cycle  theory,  European  Economic  Review,  forthcoming. 
Danthine,  J.P.  and  J.B.  Donaldson,  1991c,  Risk  sharing  in  the  business  cycle,  European 
Economic  Review,  forthcoming. 
Donaldson,  J.  B.  and  R.  Mehra,  1984,  Comparative  dynamics  of  an  equilibrium  intertemporal 
asset  pricing  model,  Review  of  Economic  Studies  51,  491-508. 
Drize,  J.H.,  1981,  Inferring  risk  tolerance  from  deductibles  in  insurance  contracts,  Geneva 
Papers  on  Risk  and  Insurance  20,  48-52. 
Dreze,  J.H.,  1989,  Labor  management,  contracts,  and  capital  markets:  A  general  equilibrium 
approach  (Basil  Blackwell,  Oxford). 
Grossman,  S.  and  R.  &chiller,  1982,  Consumption  correlatedness  and  risk  measurement  in 
economies  with  non-traded  assets  and  heterogeneous  information,  Journal  of  Financial 
Economics  10,  195-210. 
Hansen,  G.,  1985,  Indivisible  labor  and  the  business  cycle,  Journal  of  Monetary  Economics  16, 
309-327. 
Hodrick,  R.J.  and  E.C.  Prescott,  1980,  Post-war  U.S.  business  cycles,  GSIA  working  paper 
(Carnegie  Mellon  University,  Pittsburgh,  PA). 
Ibbotson,  R.  and  R.A.  Sinquefeld,  1979,  Stocks,  bonds,  bills,  and  inflation:  Historical  returns 
(1926-1978)  (Financial  Analysts’  Research  Foundations,  Charlottesville,  VA). 
Kydland,  F.  and  E.C.  Prescott.  1977.  Rules  rather  than  discretion:  The  inconsistencv  of  outimal 
plans,  Journal  of  Political  Economy  85,  473-491. 
_  _ 
Kydland,  F.  and  EC.  Prescott,  1982,  Time  to  build  and  aggregate  fluctuations,  Econometrica  50, 
1345-1370. 
Lucas,  R.E.,  Jr.,  1978,  Asset  prices  in  an  exchange  economy,  Econometrica  66,  1429-1445. 
Mankiw,  N.G.,  1986,  The  equity  premium  and  the  concentration  of  aggregate  shocks,  Journal  of 
Financial  Economics  17,  211-219. 
Mankiw,  N.B.  and  S.P.  Zeldes,  1991,  The  consumption  of  stockholders  and  non-stockholders, 
Journal  of  Financial  Economics  29,  97-112. 
Mehra,  R.,  1988,  On  the  existence  and  representation  of  equilibrium  in  an  economy  with  growth 
and  nonstationary  consumption,  International  Economic  Review  29,  131-135. 
Mehra,  R.  and  E.C.  Prescott,  1985,  The  equity  premium:  A  puzzle,  Journal  of  Monetary 
Economics  15,  145-161. 
Merton,  R.C.,  1973,  An  intertemporal  asset  pricing  model,  Econometrica  41,  867-887. 
Nason,  J.N.,  1988,  The  equity  premium  and  time-varying  risk  behavior,  Finance  and  economics 
discussion  paper  no.  11  (Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve,  Washington,  DC). 
Prescott,  E.C.,  1986,  Theory  ahead  of  business  cycle  measurement,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Minneapolis  Quarterly  Review  10,  9-22. 
Prescott,  E.C.  and  R.  Mehra,  1980,  Recursive  competitive  equilibrium:  The  case  of  homoge- 
neous  households,  Econometrica  48,  1365-1379. 
Reitz,  T.A.,  1988,  The  equity  premium:  A  solution,  Journal  of  Monetary  Economics  22,  117-133. 